Animal suffering, God and lessons from the Book of Job by Gasser, Georg
religions
Article




Citation: Gasser, Georg. 2021.
Animal Suffering, God and Lessons
from the Book of Job. Religions 12:
1047. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel
12121047
Academic Editors: Piotr Roszak and
Sasa Horvat
Received: 14 September 2021
Accepted: 16 November 2021
Published: 25 November 2021
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral
with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affil-
iations.
Copyright: © 2021 by the author.
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and
conditions of the Creative Commons
Attribution (CC BY) license (https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
4.0/).
Katholisch-Theologische Fakultät, Universität Augsburg, 86159 Augsburg, Germany;
georg.gasser@kthf.uni-augsburg.de
Abstract: Nature shows itself to us in ambivalent ways. Breathtaking beauty and cruelty lie close
together. A Darwinian image of nature seems to imply that nature is a mere place of violence, cruelty
and mercilessness. In this article, I first explore the question of whether such an interpretation of
nature is not one-sided by being phrased in overly moral terms. Then, I outline how the problem
of animal suffering relates to a specific understanding of God as moral agent. Finally, in the main
part of the argumentation, I pursue the question to what extent the problem of animal (and human)
suffering does not arise for a concept of God couched in less personalistic terms. If God’s perspective
towards creation is rather de-anthropocentric, then moral concerns might be of less importance as we
generally assume. Such an understanding of the divine is by no means alien to the biblical-theistic
tradition. I argue that it finds strong echoes in the divine speeches in the Book of Job: They aim at
teaching us to accept both the beauty and the tragic of existence in a creation that seen in its entirety
is rather a-moral. Finally, I address the question what such a concept of God could mean for our
existence.
Keywords: (dis)values in nature; animal theodicy; God in the Book of Job; non-anthropocentric view
of God; holistic understanding of creation
1. Introduction
To many modern eyes it seems obvious to describe nature as a place of violence, cruelty
and mercilessness. We are aware that life emerges and continues to exist by destroying
or displacing other life. We know that mass extinctions are part of natural history, that it
is primarily the strongest and best adapted individuals to the environment that survive,
that most young animals do not reach adulthood and that a quick death is not the rule but
rather the exception (Schneider 2020, chap. 1).
There are no moral principles at work in nature, but the right of the strongest prevails,
whose existence is ruthlessly based on the expense of others. Those who describe nature
in this way do not normally assume that this is a purely subjective description owed to
a human perspective. The claim made generally is stronger: Many natural processes are
intrinsic disvalues and, thus, evil per se. For instance, Thomas H. Huxley writes a few
decades after the publication of Darwin’s The Origin of Species: “Thus, brought before the
tribunal of ethics, the cosmos might well seem to stand condemned. The conscience of man
revolted against the moral indifference of nature, and the microscopic atom should have
found the illimitable macrocosm guilty” (Huxley 1894, p. 59).
While for centuries imitating nature was considered desirable because it was assumed
that nothing happens in nature for no purpose, Huxley identifies a stark contrast between
nature and (human) culture in the light of evolutionary theory: Culture is characterised by
morality or at least by a striving for it. Nature, instead, is morally indifferent and thus, we
find no docking points for moral categories in natural processes.
The influential evolutionary biologist George C. Williams goes even one step further
and emphasises that “[m]odern sociobiological insights and studies of organisms in natural
settings support Huxley and justify an even more extreme condemnation of nature and
an antithesis of the naturalistic fallacy: what is, in the biological world, normally ought
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not” (Williams 1988, p. 383). Similarly, the philosopher Mark Sagoff concedes: “The
ways in which creatures in nature die are typically violent: predation, starvation, disease,
parasitism, cold. The dying animal in the wild does not understand the vast ocean of
misery into which it and billions of other animals are born only to drown” (Sagoff 1984,
p. 303).
Such a negative understanding appears particularly problematic against a theistic
background, since it seems highly questionable how a morally perfect God would allow or
even consciously will the existence of a world containing so many evils. In this paper, I
address this question by arguing for the following theses:
• An account of widespread disvalue in nature is not persuasive. Rather, we should re-
main neutral about it as different interpretations of nature suggest a rather ambiguous
picture.
• Classical theodicy presupposes a framework that operates with decidedly human
moral categories. This framework is by no means the only possible conceptual scheme
for dealing with the problem of suffering.
• A non-anthropocentric understanding of God provides a fundamentally different
framework for tackling the problem of animal (and human) suffering. Such an under-
standing of God is not the mere consequence of philosophical speculation but is at
least partially rooted in the biblical tradition as the divine speeches in the Book of Job
suggest.
In my following considerations, I will address these points in sequence.
2. Disvalues in Nature?
Talk about (dis)values in nature needs some preliminary clarification because it in-
volves different normative concepts (McShane 2007). As the term is used here, it basically
means that natural facts have intrinsic value, that is, they dispose of properties which make
them valuable apart from any relations to other states. Natural facts can be quite different
things such as individual living beings, certain eco-systemic relations or untouched natu-
ral areas. Often is invoked a supervenience relation for explaining how such things are
connected to value: If there is a certain natural fact X, then a normative fact N supervenes
upon it. Claiming that X has intrinsic value N says that the value N of X exists prior to
any human (or other) conceptualisation and perspective on the world. In other words,
the view that X has intrinsic value N involves the claim that X has a normative standing
which ought to be taken into consideration in any adequate grasp of X. Thus, we should
think of these parts of the natural world as appropriate objects of wonder, awe, admiration,
beauty or respect independent from subjective preferences and interests. The same applies
to disvalues. If X has intrinsic disvalue, then the appropriate reaction is disgust, horror and
moral rejection because X involves objective features which are bad.
A list of possible candidates of disvalues in nature contains a whole range of different
phenomena such as predation, parasitism, selfishness, randomness, blindness of natu-
ral processes, disaster, indifference, waste, struggle, suffering and death (Rolston 1992;
Schneider 2020, chap. 1). I will limit myself to discuss three of the phenomena mentioned:
predation, parasitism and disaster. Taking off from environmental ethicist Holmes Rolston
III’s reasoning, I argue that the thesis of widespread disvalue in nature is questionable at
least.
2.1. Predation
Obviously, predation is bad for the prey. If a predator catches a prey animal, pain and
death are the result. One can consider predation to be lamentable and thus demand that
humans should assist animals in preserving their lives when it is within human power to
do so. However, from the lion’s perspective, a prey animal is a resource that contributes
significantly to the lion’s good life. The lion must hunt in order to be able to provide
food for itself and its offspring, since hunting is without alternative for a lion’s survival.
Therefore, Rolston argues: “The disvalue to the prey is, however, a value to the predator,
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and, with a systematic turn, perspective changes. The violent death of the hunted means
life to the hunter. There is no value loss so much as value capture; [ . . . ]. The pains of the
prey are matched by the pleasures of the predator” (Rolston 1992, p. 253).
The idea Rolston proposes is not a utilitarian trade-off between the pleasure of the
predator and the pain of the hunted animal but rather value supervening upon a complex
natural state of affairs. The skillful manifestation of the lion’s hunting capacities can be
seen as an intrinsic good as well as the successful escape tactics of the zebras. Since older,
sick or otherwise impaired animals often fall prey to predators, instrumental value is also
involved since successful hunting brings a benefit to the species involved.
Rolston points out that we commonly admire the strength, camouflage, endurance, in-
stinct and hunting skills of predators and flight animals alike. Without predation, these com-
plex skills would never have evolved. Philosopher of science Peter Godfrey-Smith describes
how these more complex abilities probably begun to develop in to the so-called “Cambrian
explosion” some 540 million years ago and how nature changed subsequently. Before this
crucial evolutionary step, animals were rather simple and relatively self-contained beings.
With the Cambrian explosion, however, Godfrey-Smith emphasises that “animals became
parts of each other’s lives in a new way, especially through predation. This means that when
one kind of organism evolves a little, it changes the environment faced by other organisms,
which evolve in response” (Godfrey-Smith 2018, p. 34).
The consequence of this entanglement of one life in another is the evolution of the
mind in response to the minds of other animals. The evolution of predators and prey lead
to the development of animals with more and more complex perceptual and cognitive
capacities. Our own evolution is based on the fact that as omnivores we were also successful
hunters. Thus, from a peculiar human perspective of individual suffering, nature appears
to be full of disvalues; from a more general systematic evolutionary perspective, instead,
it is less clear whether these disvalues are not necessary means for goods, to which we
generally assign a high axiological value such as a rich subjective life and a broad array of
complex cognitive and agentive faculties.
One may consider such axiological value ascriptions as anthropomorphically inspired.
However, from the perspective of moral realism one can argue that these natural state of
affairs go hand in hand with intrinsic values and that we do well to recognise these features
of reality from our specific human perspective as well (for a sophisticated defence of moral
realism, see Shafer-Landau 2003). Provided, one is willing to accept this line of reasoning,
then one might wonder what to do with parasitism as all skilfulness, elegance and beauty
in the behaviour of predation and flight seems to be lost.
2.2. Parasitism
Parasitism can be regarded as a form of predation as it infects its host and feeds on
it. The problem, however, is that parasites, in stark contrast to “real” predators, have not
developed any sophisticated skills for predation; rather, they regressed to degenerative
forms of life. Thus, there is nothing to admire when it comes to parasites. The well-known
ornithologist Alexander Skutch writes: “The peculiar faculties of animals are the directive
senses and the power of locomotion. The host of flukes, tapeworms, cestodes, and other
animals that live entirely within the bodies of bigger animals—unpigmented, sightless,
deaf, practically devoid of the power of independent locomotion—are parasites of the
highest degree” (Skutch 1948, p. 514).
Evil is therefore twofold: On the one hand, we have the degeneration of the parasite,
and, on the other hand, it causes pain and destruction in the host. According to this
interpretation, parasitism results in a major step backwards in evolutionary development,
since the parasite, by adapting to the host, becomes increasingly dependent on it and
increasingly loses the abilities for an independent biological existence.
Again, this view is just one side of the coin. It is rarely the case that the ecological
system of parasite and host as such degenerates. Rather, the skills lost by the parasite
are borrowed from the host. The parasite has lost locomotion because the host moves
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for the parasite; the parasite has a reduced spectrum of sense perception because it is
sufficient if the host has it. From a biological perspective, such a way of living provides an
optimal adaptation to the environment because it increases the survival of the species or the
individual. In addition, it involves skilfulness to achieve it. Thus, with parasitism might
come more value than would exist in its absence because the value of the life of parasitic
creatures themselves and the frequent beneficial impact on hosts could well exceed the
disvalues to the creatures parasitised upon (see also Rolston 1992, pp. 255–56). Let us
therefore turn to a third point: What about the many natural disasters, which cause so
much animal suffering or even the extinction of entire eco-systems?
2.3. Disaster
We are all familiar with the destructive forces of nature. Hurricanes, volcanic eruptions,
earthquakes or floods cause much damage and suffering among humans and in nature.
However, from a larger perspective, these negative forces are part of a systemic whole that
has positive value overall. Rolston writes: “Floods, windstorms lightning storms, and such
violence would be more or less like wildfire in ecosystems, a bad thing for individuals
burned and in short range, but not really all that bad systemically in long range, given
nature’s restless creativity” (Rolston 1992, p. 265).
Analogous to this observation, early environmentalist philosopher and advocate for
the preservation of wilderness, John Muir, describes an earthquake in Yosemite in 1872,
emphasising not so much its destructive as its creative power: “Nature [ . . . ] then created
[ . . . ] a new set of features, simply by giving the mountains a shake—changing not only the
high peaks and cliffs, but the streams. As soon as these rock avalanches fell every stream
began to sing new songs [ . . . ]. Storms of every sort, torrents, earthquakes, cataclysms,
„convulsions of nature“ etc. however mysterious and lawless at first sight they might
seem, are only harmonious notes in the song of creation, varied expressions of God’s love”
(Muir [1912] 1954, p. 169).
Muir reminds us that the positive side of nature’s destructive forces must be taken
into account. Forces in nature causing annihilation and death are at the same time those
forces that give rise to new life-promoting landscapes. Although Muir’s interpretation of
nature may have a romantic tendency, it is ultimately a scientific insight that life quickly
returns to landscapes destroyed from earthquakes, floods, fires or volcanic eruptions and
that these destructive forces help to create new environments, ecosystems and species in it.
Seen in this light, the view of nature as place of disvalue appears to be increasingly
partial. There is no doubt that the aforementioned evils exist, but ecological theory suggests
that without them, nature as we know it would probably not exist at all; instead, we would
probably be confronted with a planet unable to generate any more complex forms of life.
Once we extend our focus away from individual destinies towards a holistic perspective
on ecosystems and the place of the species in it, patterns of stability, order and beauty come
into view. From a systemic point of view, disvalue can mutate into value. The tragic loss of
an individual is the consequence of prolific life-cycles that cannot exhibit their generative
forces in a fundamentally different way. Robin Attfield observes: “Certainly nature does
not observe social justice or compensate individual sufferers, but the overall system is
not one of unalleviated misery, and would seem to embody greater value than would be
predictable for any system devoid of suffering” (Attfield 2000, p. 294; see also Zamulinski
2010).
Someone who is familiar with the relevant ecological details is likely to broaden the
parochial perspective from individual destinies to a holistic view of evolutionary processes.
This shift in perspective undermines a disvalue-account of nature. First, one has to note
that there are goods that could hardly have come into being without the evils under
consideration. Reference to these goods, however, is less about a classic higher-goods
defence and more about a view of nature in the sense of a complex system, where stable
natural forces, evolutionary creativity, the beauty of the living or the adaptation to the most
diverse environmental conditions are in the foreground. Second, such a holistic view of
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nature promotes non-moral and, thus, non-anthropocentric standards of understanding
and, consequently, a picture of nature emerges which is axiologically ambiguous at least. It
provides the possibility to consider a natural process as inherently positive even though
often not good for an individual creature involved in it. Finally, one should keep in mind
that natural processes are often too complex to be captured by a one-sided perspective.
Symbiotic relationships, states of equilibrium or even cooperative behaviour are also central
evolutionary driving forces that, unlike hostile competitiveness resulting in suffering, can
be classified as mainly positive (wide range of philosophical and theological interpretations
of natural processes apart from orthodox Darwinian accounts are provided by Moritz
2014).
3. Animal Suffering and Theism
The aim of the argumentation so far has been to show that the view that evil is to be
located at the very core of evolution is questionable, at least. Most probably, as in many
other philosophical debates, also here is little consensus as to what facts count as values
and disvalues, and furthermore, which costs and benefits should be assigned to them. In
whatever way this may be categorised, what seems obvious is that a theist faces greater
problems in ascribing overall value to nature than a non-theist. For a non-theist, the fact
that many animals suffer or most organisms die prematurely may be tragic, but ultimately,
this fact can be accepted with a regretful sigh: Nature is apparently a bit clumsy, wasteful
and not particularly elegant. However, what should one expect from blind forces of nature?
The picture is radically different for a theist. By a theist, I refer to a person who
assumes the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect creator who is part
of the moral order. The concept of God involved here may be described as the God of the
philosophers in contrast to the God of biblical revelation. However, one has to bear in mind
that this concept is not competing with the biblical tradition but is rather based upon it
and clarified by philosophical analysis. In the light of such a perfect being in theology, the
problem of evil becomes particularly problematic because in a world created by a perfect,
not only supreme being, the multitude of suffering and its intensities are phenomena that
we do not expect. The claim is not that there should be no evils at all in a world created by
such a God, but that there should not be so many terrible evils, since it is difficult to see
that possible goals of creation cannot also be realised in an alternative world containing
less evil.
Against this background, the problem of animal suffering is a variant of the traditional
problem of evil. A particular challenge, however, is that many of the answers developed in
the context of human theodicies such as the free will defence or the soul-making theodicy
seem less convincing when it comes to animals because they do not possess the cognitive
and moral capacities required for these accounts to work. In light of this challenge, Joshua
Moritz, for instance, argues that a gradualist account to evolution may be helpful here
because “animal choices, though perhaps not as self-conscious, free, or morally culpable
as those of humans, are still theologically significant insofar as they influence the degree
and specific types of evolutionary suffering that are brought into existence through such
choices” (Moritz 2014, p. 373). However, it is questionable what the term “animal choice”
is supposed to mean here as the range of possible behaviours in a given situation is quite
limited for most animals. Cognitively complex animals can change behaviours through
learning within a limited framework, but a (sub-conscious) decision against a behaviour
causing suffering that was so far typical for individuals of this species is likely to be too
demanding for most animal species. I do not mean to suggest that such an assumption
is entirely out of the question or that it cannot be argued for with the help of additional
theological assumptions. Rather, the thrust of my argument points to the fact that an
extension of a classical free will defence to animals must be supported by significant
auxiliary hypotheses coming along with argumentative costs that appear difficult for many
to accept.
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The same problem applies to the soul-making theodicy, since an inner psycho-moral
maturation process or a reorientation of one’s own way of life towards the morally better
through a process of suffering can hardly be assumed in the animal kingdom. John Hick,
for instance, openly admits: “To some, the pain suffered in the animal kingdom beneath
the human level has constituted the most baffling aspect of the problem of evil. For the
considerations that may lighten the problem as it affects mankind—the positive value of
moral freedom despite its risks; and the necessity that a world which is to be the scene of
soul-making should contain real challenges, hardships, defeats, and mysteries—do not
apply in the case of the lower animals” (Hick 1966, p. 309).
Similarly, McCord Adams excludes (most) animals from her soteriological account
to theodicy because they are not cognitively capable of perceiving experienced evils as
possible sources of meaning and positive transformation (see also Stump 2010, p. 4).
McCord Adams explicates: “If all mammals and perhaps most kinds of birds, reptiles,
and fish suffer pain, many naturally lack self-consciousness and the sort of transtemporal
psychic unity required to participate in horrors” (McCord-Adams 1999, p. 28).
The idea is that even if God would redeem the suffering experienced in this life by
resurrecting animals in a zoological garden of Eden, they would not dispose of the cognitive
powers to connect their past experiences with the present ones. Present suffering might
enable one to experience future pleasant states in a more conscious and intense way. Since
most animals do not have the required psychic unity connecting past with present, they
would be unable to realise that God positively transforms past suffering in the resurrected
state.
As indicated above, this limited scope of classical theodicies has been responded to by
the development of new accounts that explicitly claim to include animals (e.g., Murray
2008; Moritz 2014; Aguti 2017; Dougherty 2014; Crummett 2017). There are a number of
suggestions as to why, from a theistic perspective, an eschatological perspective including
animals (or at least more complex types of animals) should be welcomed (e.g., section III in
Hereth and Timpe 2020).
Of central importance for our considerations is the insight that both classical accounts
to theodicy and those that want to include animals presuppose moral categories that are
familiar to us: If God is a loving person and morally perfect, then it is hard to imagine that
God can simply pass over all these different forms of suffering. Rather, we must assume
that suffering is a necessary means to a higher good, and what makes the theodicy problem
so intractable for us is that we have great difficulties identifying these higher goods. What
is often lost sight of is that this concept of God as a morally perfect agent is by no means the
only idea of the God that theism has produced. So called “classical theism” is a powerful
alternative tradition that is not oriented towards the concept of God as a person, but at
most ascribes certain personal properties to God, which are, however, supplemented by a
range of non-personal properties.
4. Beyond Anthropocentrism
Classical theism is often contrasted with personal theism. Personal theism thinks
that among God’s primary and foremost interests is to enter into a loving relationship
with each sentient creature. Proponents of classical theism, instead, point out that classical
theism proposes a concept of God that is difficult to connect with our concept of person.
John Cooper, for instance, writes: “[C]lassical theism asserts that God is transcendent,
self-sufficient, eternal, and immutable in relation to the world; thus he does not change
through time and is not affected by his relation to his creatures” (Cooper 2006, p 14).
As understood here, then, “far more central” to classical theism than the so-called
person-like omni-properties omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence are the doc-
trines of divine transcendence, simplicity, eternity or immutability. These are what mark
out classical theism from other versions of theism that think of God more in personal
categories. According to Brian Davies, for classical theists, “God is primarily the Creator.
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God is [ . . . ] causally responsible for the existence of everything other than himself”
(Davies 2003, p. 2).
Taking God as the transcendent and sole creator means that everything other than
God is radically dependent on God for its very existence. Prioritising God’s role as creator
has wide-ranging implications for the question in what sense personal categories can be
ascribed to God. For instance, one (metaphysical) implication is that God bears no real
relations to creation because no creature can have any kind of impact on God, however
minimal this impact might be. Creation is entirely dependent on God but God is in no
way dependent on creation. Because becoming related to any created entity would be a
change, classical theists maintain that no creature can cause God to change. Thus, radical
metaphysical independence implies immutability and existence outside time because
existence in time would, again, constitute some form of dependence from it.
It should be apparent that the conceptual scheme of classical theism puts into question
the view of God being a moral agent analogous to humans. Accordingly, the overall
framework of the problem of evil changes: If God is in no way dependent on the world and
cannot be influenced by it, the moral standards obvious to us are hardly applicable to God.
Since the problem of evil lives from these standards, evils in the world no longer count as
direct counter-evidence to God’s existence as it might be the case that our moral concerns
are in no way God’s concerns. Ordinary moral questions have an essential anthropocentric
direction which no longer are in place when it comes to God.
Taking such a non-anthropocentric view of God seriously raises the question what
alternative possibilities for conceptualising God’s relationship to creation are at hand. In the
light of the arguments in the previous sections, one could say that God’s view of creation is
similar to the understanding of nature proposed by Rolston or Muir: God takes delight
in the creative fecundity, beauty and order of creation, even if the individual suffering of
animals and humans is an integral—and most likely unavoidable—part of it. God’s view
on creation is primarily holistic whereby such a perspective does not automatically imply
that individual suffering is completely overlooked or considered of no further importance.
One can grant that nature clearly has its negative aspects, in particular if the focus
is on the individual fate of specific living beings. However, as has been argued, such a
view is one-sided, and the positive features ought to be considered as well, which are
more likely to come into sight from a more systemic and holistic view. Within a theistic
framework, one can presuppose that God has created the universe because the positive
sides ultimately prevail and are particularly prominent in God’s perspective. God is less
the comforting person-like perfect agent who acts within the world to realise its purposes
set by providence. Rather, God is the creator and sustainer of the entire universe, which is
a morally deeply ambiguous blend of pleasure and pain.
Perhaps God’s perspective can be expressed with the help of scholastic terminology
as follows: God does not want these evils in the antecedent will, but he allows them in
the consequent will in order to be able to be creatively active and to realise the goods that
come with a universe full of life. The fundamental laws of creation involve a dynamic
exchange of matter and energy, determine becoming and decaying and indicate that
struggle, competition and death is at the very heart of the living. Moral categories do
not have to be completely abolished from this picture, as also classical theism attributes
personal characteristics to God, but these categories are no longer at the centre of the
problem, or at least they are no longer the sole determinants of it.
The crucial point is the broadening of the perspective from individual instances of
suffering to goods that characterise the universe as a whole. In the philosophical tradition,
Leibniz, for example, proposed such a view: According to him, the suffering of living
beings is less a moral question than the inevitable consequence of creaturely finitude. The
intrinsic imperfection of individual living beings is to be related to the more comprehensive
perfection of the universe and placed in a corresponding relationship to it. God has to
accept the necessity of suffering in nature if he wants to create such a dynamic and creative
nature as the one familiar to us. Leibniz writes: “But one must believe that even sufferings
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and monstrosities are part of order; and it is well to bear in mind not only that it was better
to admit these defects and these monstrosities than to violate general laws [ . . . ] just as
sometimes there are appearances of irregularity in mathematics which issue finally in a
great order when one has finally got to the bottom of them.” (Leibniz 2009, pp. 276–77).
At this point, one may wonder how the biblical understanding of God fits into this
picture. Is it not the case that the biblical God is primarily conceived in personal categories
and moral standards related to them? An essential motivation for thinking of God in
personal terms is precisely that we can only imagine a personal relationship with such a
God as Richard Swinburne, for instance, explains: “If [ . . . ] God were immutable in the
strong sense, he would be a very lifeless being. The God of the Hebrew Bible, in which
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all have their roots, is pictured as being in continual
interaction with humans [ . . . ]. A totally immutable God is a lifeless God, not a God with
whom one can have a personal relationship—as theists have normally claimed that one
can have with God” (Swinburne 2016, p. 233).
However, the God of classical theism is not merely a consequence of philosophical
reflections opposed to the biblical tradition. Rather, in the biblical tradition itself, references
can be found that recoil from an overly personalised and relational God, or so I will argue
by referring to the story of Job. Taking off from a line of interpretation to be found, among
others, in the work of philosopher Wes Morriston and in the theological commentary
of Carol A. Newsom, I argue that the divine speeches to Job draw attention to the fact
that God is primarily creator and sustainer of a vast, wild and awesome universe where
anthropocentric moral standards do not lead to an adequate understanding of God’s
relationship to creation: Creation as a whole is valuable, not only or primarily because
of the humans in it. If this line of interpretation is correct and a central message of the
story of Job is to shift from an anthropocentric to a non-anthropocentric and holistic view
of creation, then this view directly affects the problem of animal suffering. As soon as
moral standards fade into the background, a theist is able to assign to suffering—though
still existentially challenging—an integral place in creation. This does not mean that the
world becomes a better and less tragic place; rather, certain questions we tend to ask, seem
misplaced because a change of perspective is needed. This is what the divine speeches call
for, and this is the difficult lesson to learn for Job (and for us). I unfold this argument in the
following sections.
5. The Divine Speeches in the Book of Job
Since the story of Job is well known, I turn directly to the divine speeches. My aim is
to argue that they display a concept of God as creator and sustainer of the universe but not
as guarantor of moral rules determining the course of history. For this purpose, it suffices
to keep in mind that the central theme in the dialogues between Job and his friends is the
question of retributive justice. A dispute over justice dominates the unfolding of the story
till to the divine speeches. As Job is unable to see any mechanism of divine justice at work
in his tragic fate, he desires to confront God directly with this issue. Moreover, God meets
Job’s desire but not in the way he had expected: God does not refer to any reasons for Job’s
suffering. Instead, God asks Job to answer a series of questions: “Then the Lord answered
Job out of the whirlwind and said: Who is this that darkens counsel by words without
knowledge? [ . . . ] Where were you when I laid the foundation of the earth? Tell me, if
you have understanding. Who determined its measurements—surely you know! Or who
stretched the line upon it?” (Job 38,1-2; 4-5a).
As Carol A. Newsom points out, the two divine speeches direct Job’s imagination to
the remote points of creation beyond the sphere of human influence: to the foundations of
the earth, the horizon, light and darkness, the gates of the underworld, the desert, barren
mountains and nature where wild animals live (Newsom 2003, pp. 241–52). The aim of
these speeches is to widen Job’s perspective from places of secure boundaries to places
where human culture and an ordered universe is put at risk and the “primary symbol of the
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chaotic” (Newsom 2003, p. 243) is experienced. God presents creation in all its splendour,
wildness and impenetrable complexity (see also McLeish 2020).
With astute biological knowledge is described how lions care for their cubs, young
ravens search for food, hinds give birth to their offspring, the ostrich hatches its eggs in the
sand or the eagle brings prey into its nest in the rocks. The places and creatures represent
the alien other to human culture and domestication. Creation seen in this way evokes
wondrous estrangement, attraction and anxiety at the same time. The detailed description
of Leviathan as primordial beast that no human can capture and dominate continues this
theme. Among the many points one can identify in the divine speeches, Wes Morriston
finds three of particular importance (Morriston 1996, pp. 342–43):
First, God is the creator of everything and fully in control of all of creation, which
also includes wild and chaotic elements. Even the primordial beasts, which no human can
control, are no threat to God.
Second, the theophany contrasts God wisdom and Job’s ignorance. The numerous
questions in the first speech almost ironically point out that Job cannot give any answers
because he has no deeper understanding of the workings of creation.
Third, the theophany celebrates the wisdom of the created order. It offers a “breath-
taking vision of the majesty and beauty of the Creator’s design” (Morriston 1996, p. 343)
and, as Newsom puts it, of “the tragic sublime” (Newsom 2003, p. 251).
6. A First Interpretation: Skepticism
A common line of interpretation of the divine speeches focuses on the second point.
God has reasons for letting Job suffer, but Job, due to his limited human knowledge, should
not expect to have insight in any of these divine reasons. You might call this interpretation
a “sceptical theist’s account” (Gomarasca 2013). Sceptical theists argue that not being able
to imagine what reasons God might have for letting people suffer does not imply that there
are not any reasons at all. Due to our limited cognitive capacities, we might simply not be
able to see these reasons. This is exactly the case with Job. Although readers of the book
are aware of these reasons, Job himself is kept in the dark about them. He is not able to
find these reasons and God does not inform him about them. As human being, so this
interpretation goes, Job cannot leave the inner-worldly realm, and therefore it is also not
possible for him to access any reasons beyond it.
The problem of such a sceptical interpretation is twofold: First, the divine speeches
do not point at the possibility of any reasons for the way God treats Job. Questions of
morality and justice are not mentioned at all. Thus, a sceptical interpretation has few points
of connection in the text itself. Second, the reasons given at the beginning are anything
but good. If these are the only reasons, then we are left with the impression that either
God’s character is of problematic nature or, if divine justice is of any concern here, then it is
inscrutable to us. As a consequence, if there is divine justice, then we are confronted with a
moral scheme we do not know how to connect in any meaningful way with human moral
standards.
7. A Second Interpretation: Humble Submission
Another, more literal interpretation of the text is, as Newsom argues, that God draws
Job’s attention away from the human realm and the question of the moral order of creation.
The divine speeches no longer continue the dominant theme of justice but present an
image of creation in all its majesty, wildness and violence where human life and culture are
present in a marginalised way at best. Job was looking for a creation of order, value and
meaning where human experiences make sense and are conducive to a rational explanation.
God, however, by presenting Leviathan, highlights the nonmoral and chaotic aspects of
creation. Newsom writes: “The face of Leviathan exposes the hubris and the self-deception
of the human rage for order” (Newsom 2003, p. 253).
Job’s responses after the first and second divine speech are brief and then he falls silent.
This attitude deserves particular attention. Some interpreters read this as an expression
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of Job’s regretful and humble submission in the face of an omnipotent and omniscient
God. John E. Hartley, for instance, concludes that Job “humbles himself before God,
conceding that he has misstated his case by speaking about things beyond his ability to
know” (Hartley 1988, p. 536). According to Hartley, Job’s reaction after the divine speeches
marks a new direction in his relationship with God because he locates his self-worth not
anymore in his own moral-spiritual behaviour and innocence but exclusively in God. The
idea is that continuing to pursue justice in this case would eventually distance Job from
God because Job would hold on to an image of God that must be overcome. Communion
with a mysterious and fascinating God is more important than understanding one’s own
fate and suffering in terms of merit and justice, and therefore, Job does not reply to the
divine speeches anymore.
8. A Third Interpretation: Creation beyond Justice
Although the above interpretation does have its merits, I think that we have to go a
step further. Job’s reaction seems quite unlikely when one considers how steadfastly he held
on to his own innocence in the dispute with his friends. He demanded an encounter with
God to prove his innocence and now, after a demonstration of God’s power, he is supposed
to simply back down without having received an answer to his nagging questions?
Morriston proposes another interpretation that seems more appropriate in the light
of the celebration of the overall cosmos and wild animal life as put forward in the divine
speeches: “[Job] sees that he counts for no more (and of course for no less) in the total
scheme of things than, say, the wild ox or the eagle. But while he is deeply moved by the
wonder of it all, he is also bewildered. He does not (yet) see how his complaint has been
answered, and he doesn’t know how to respond to God’s demand for a reply” (Morriston
2017, p. 235).
The same goes for Job’s reaction after the second speech when he declares: “I had
heard of you by the hearing of the ear, but now my eye sees you” (Job 42: 6). For Morriston,
the first line refers to traditional wisdom about God as expressed in Job’s and the friend’s
discussion about divine justice and goodness. What, however, can it mean that now Job
sees God? Quoting Rudolph Otto, Morriston thinks that liberated from conventional
platitudes about God, Job newly experiences “the downright stupendousness, the well-
nigh daemonic and wholly incomprehensible character of the eternal creative power”—a
power that “mocks at all conceiving but can yet stir the mind to its depths, fascinate and
overbrim the heart” (Morriston 2017, p. 237; quoting Otto 1936, p. 82).
This interpretation is supported by Newsom’s suggestion that Job makes the illumi-
nating and at the same time tragic insight that man finds himself in a creation full of tension
and fracture. Man must work out structures of order in creation to be able to live according
to his rational and moral nature, but at the same time, this creation also contains untamable
elements hostile to man, which can have tragic effects on human (and animal) existence.
Newsome says: “What Job has just heard in the divine speeches, however, is a devastating
undermining of his understanding of the unproblematic moral continuity between himself,
the world, and God. It is a profound loss of unity, a recognition of the deeply fractured
nature of reality” (Newsom 2003, p. 255).
The idea is, thus, that Job leaves behind his claim to find a moral justification for
his suffering, since he has realised that creation does not follow moral principles that
commonly apply to the human social realm. As long as Job was searching for a moral order
in creation, he could not yet free himself from his overly anthropocentric image of God.
The divine speeches widened his focus by directing his attention away from his own fate
and question of justice towards the splendour and tragic beauty of all creation.
Accordingly, Job does not receive any new information about the why of his own
suffering; rather, his paradigmatic view on creation and the creator radically changes. By
no longer holding to the traditional insight that God rewards the just and punishes the
unjust, Job is able to accept his own fate and experience God directly as a sublime power in
nature who does not rule the world in accordance with a moral order. God is neither just
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nor unjust as these categories simply do not apply. Job accepts reality as it is, and in doing
so, he sees God’s presence in creation.
It should be noted that this insight is different from the sceptical theist’s view. As
Hartley has also noted, continuing to ask for divine justice makes no sense; the reason
for stopping to do so, however, is different. It is less the understanding that we have
to renounce all personal claims because they might erect a barrier between us and God.
Rather, the idea is that creation is not ordered according to any principles of justice and
therefore it makes no sense to demand them. God is the transcendent Other beyond good
and evil, and once this is recognised, one is also able to accept that “[t]ragic rupture is the
figure at the heart of human existence” (Newsom 2003, p. 257). This acceptance reorders
and deepens Job’s previous relationship with God. Morriston puts it this way: “He has
been liberated from the futile craving for divinely guaranteed moral order that had fueled
his rebellion and bound him in misery, and freed for the wild wonder and beauty of what
is (Morriston 2017, p. 240).
This interpretation has clear advantages over the other outlined interpretations. First,
it is able to make straightforward sense of the divine speeches without taking it as metaphor
for something else. Second, it explains Job’s attitude of repentance and silence without
having to assume that Job was humbled and silenced by God’s superiority and might.
Rather, Job’s behaviour is in continuity with his previous desire to encounter God for
understanding God’s behaviour towards him. This desire is met, but Job has to learn that it
does not correspond to what he had originally expected. Thus, Job’s trials can be seen as a
spiritual journey one outcome of which is the insight that creation is a sphere that “carries
with it no purely human-centered answers” (Chase 2013, p. 280). This reading, finally,
makes sense from a spiritual point of view: When we gain a deeper understanding of our
own existence in the experience of the sublime, we may feel a kind of a liberation and joyful
peace that takes away any form of anxiety or sorrow related to worldly things, at least for
a moment. Worldly trials seem less burdensome than before, as one’s entire attention is
absorbed by the experience of the sublime. Instead of asking questions concerning one’s
existence, one simply “is” in the presence of the divine.
9. Two Objections and the Outline of a Proposal
No doubt, this reading is controversial and faces various objections. A first objection
is that it does not take individual suffering seriously enough because the main focus is on
creation in general. A second objection raises the question of the extent to which such a
God is worthy of worship.
I reply to these criticisms in turn. First of all, there is a certain tension in monotheistic
conceptions of God, as the difference between classical and personal theism indicates.
Classical theism sees God as the wholly transcendent creator of everything that exists, as
the source of all being that is in no way dependent on anything. Personal theism, instead,
highlights that religious experience and the biblical tradition tells us that God aims at
entering in a personal relationship with creation and is deeply concerned about the life of
every single human being. It seems that the concept of God in the Book of Job oscillates
between these two conceptions. On the one hand, God’s interests seem to be directed
towards the whole of creation, while individual destinies play a subordinate role therein,
and on the other hand, God cares about the life of a particular creature such as Job and
even speaks to him. This tension is not resolved, and maybe a first lesson is that we have
to live with it. Faith goes hand in hand with the demand for justice and compassion, but at
the same time, it must also recognise that our world is a place of beauty containing tragic
moments of suffering and loss that cannot be adequately captured and explained in the
categories of justice and morality.
Newsom proposes how such a reading connects to the happy ending where Job has
his fortunes restored. The ending expresses that Job is now able to embrace the goodness
of life in all its fragile, vulnerable and tragic dimension: “Read in dialogic relation, the
sublimity of the divine speeches and the beauty of the prose epilogue gestures toward the
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human incorporation of tragedy into the powerful imperatives of desire: to live and to
love” (Newsom 2003, p. 258). Similarly, Steven Chase argues that the explicit statement in
the epilogue that the three daughters receive an inheritance along their brothers means a
significant departure from the culture of that time. It indicates that within the awareness
that there is no guarantee of a life that is just and free from tragic events, for Job, “all things
are precious, all things are to be loved” (Chase 2013, p. 275).
Against this background, an answer to the first objection can be given: The story of Job
can be seen as a critique of any conception God with overly anthropocentric interests. God
sees all of creation as valuable and human creatures are one, but not the only or central,
aspect of this holistic picture of a value-laden nature. God is responsive to values, but these
values may not make an exclusive reference to us. Just as Job ends up loving and caring
equally for all his children, God considers all life to be precious and is at the same time
fully aware that suffering and death are intrinsic parts of the cycle of the living.
Mark Wynn draws attention to the fact that often “our conceptions of value fail to
capture certain systematic features of the goodness of the world” (Wynn 1999a, p. 36).
Wynn argues that one way to remedy this deficiency is “to have extensive first-hand
experience of nature” (Wynn 1999a, p. 36). I take this to mean that certain axiological
aspects of creation require a non-anthropocentric view on it. Consider, for instance, the
description of the heavy windstorm by John Muir: “Nature was holding high festival, and
every fiber of the most rigid giants thrilled with glad excitement. [ . . . ] Even when the
grand anthem had swelled to its highest pitch, I could distinctly hear the varying tones
of individual trees [ . . . ]. Each was expressing itself in its own way, singing its own song,
and making its own peculiar gestures, manifesting a richness of variety to be found in no
other forest I have yet seen” (Muir [1912] 1954, pp. 185–86).
John Muir is completely absorbed in this natural spectacle. Experiencing the threaten-
ing majesty of nature can contribute towards a significant rethinking of our own concerns.
The divine speeches call for a self-transcendence and redirection towards the worth of
things in themself, independent from their instrumental value for specific human purposes.
They relativise our natural egocentric perspective and call to complement it with one
that assigns an intrinsic value to nature in its beautiful as well as dangerous and violent
peculiarities. Job is drawn, so to speak, into a deeper understanding of the very nature of
things—into their very dependence from God and “exhibition of divine glory” (Southgate
2014, p. 801).
Such an attitude towards nature does not imply that moral questions are suspended
or should no longer have a genuine place in our understanding of reality. It is part of
human nature to be endowed with moral capacities, and therefore, this central aspect of
our existential constitution cannot be ignored. However, the Book of Job reminds us that
this perspective is not the only one with which we should look at the world. The world as
such is valuable to God independently of any ultimate moral order. God wants us to live
a life immersed in such a world by accepting the beautiful as well as inexplicable tragic
dimensions of creation and our existence in it.
This brings me to the second objection whether such a God is worthy of worship.
Referring to Mark Wynn’s use, worship can be defined as an attitude where “the believer
relates herself to the marvel of existence, by placing herself in wonder and adoration before
the one in whom all existence is contained” (Wynn 1999b, pp. 151–52). It should be noted
that Wynn is not referring here to God as a maximally perfect being but to the ground of
all existence. An attitude of reverence and gratitude is appropriate when one comprehends
the wonder of one’s own existence as of existence in general. Take again Muir’s intense
experience of the heavy windstorm: Muir feels himself deeply immersed in the marvel
of existence, the power of nature, the sublime process of creation and destruction. Muir
surely senses admiration and reverence for this spectacle of nature. Whether nature as a
non-personal system is also an appropriate object of worship is a matter of dispute but
surely an open question (see Cockayne 2020), and many representatives of a pantheistic
understanding of reality or a religion of nature are likely to answer it in the affirmative.
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God in the Book of Job appears to be worthy of worship because he holds the order of
the entire cosmos, including its chaotic elements, in his hands. This cosmos is an ambiguous
blend of beauty and suffering. The spiritual calling is to accept the reality of this image
of the cosmos and of its creator and sustainer without any delusions. In addition, it has
to be kept in mind that this God does not show himself closed to human longing but
has a genuine interest that people are able to form an appropriate image of God—even
if the grasp of this image entails a profound and painful transformation towards less
anthropocentric categories of the divine.
10. Conclusions
The view proposed may not be easy to accept. Like Job, we desire a world in which
our fundamental moral intuitions are preserved and respected. Perhaps, however, our
world cannot meet this demand. I have argued that the story of Job suggests such an
interpretation. Such an insight may be disappointing but it can also be liberating: It makes
clear why we cannot give a satisfactory answer to the various facets of the problem of evil.
It does not make this problem disappear, but it no longer makes us despair in front of a
God we try in vain to understand. The crucial categories for looking at nature are less
moral than the creativity, richness and fragile beauty of life as such. For philosopher of
religion Wesley Wildman, such a view provides relief: “It ends the scourge of incoherent
and morally desperate anthropomorphism in God ideas. It dissolves the problem of divine
neglect. And it poses a bracing moral challenge to human beings to take responsibility for
themselves, for each other, and for the world” (Wildman 2017, p. 225).
Interestingly, in recent debates in the philosophy of religion, one can notice a turning
away from personalistic images of God. A central motivation for this is the unresolved
problem of evil (see, e.g., Mulgan 2015; Bishop and Perszyk 2017; Wildman 2017). These
accounts favor conceptions of the divine responsive to objective values such as existence,
life, beauty, creativity, diversity and—in the human case—a striving for goodness. In the
light of the considerations proposed here, one could say that such an understanding of
the divine is an integral—though rather neglected—strand of traditional theism as the
Book of Job makes clear. The exceedingly diverse dimensions of reality, from the moral
impenetrability of wild nature and the indifference of the dark cosmos to the fascinating
diversity of animal cooperation and human altruistic concerns, cannot be grasped without
tension. Taking seriously that God is the creator of all there is implies considering more
closely what it would mean for our understanding of God and our religious practice if
God were primarily to care for the welfare of all creation and not only or mainly for the
manifold sufferings of animals and humans.
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